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STUDENT MATERIALS
Case Comment

NEW YORK V. QUARLES:
DIMMING MIRANDA'S BRIGHT LINE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Western society places high value upon two conflicting ideals:
individual liberty and the rule of law.' Nowhere is this opposition more evident
than in a democracy, where the inherent tension between the rights of the individual
and the rights of the citizenry-between individual liberty and public welfare-lies
at the very foundation of the regime. The concern of the judiciary and the focus
of constitutional law have traditionally been directed toward the relations between
the individual and his government. Moreover, the founding fathers were adamant
in their belief that the power of government should not be enhanced at the expense
of the rights of the individual, and that limitations must be placed upon the government so as not to encroach upon individual liberty:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.2
Miranda v. Arizona' and other cases dealing with the protection of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination are indicative of the government's
attempt to fulfill its obligation to control itself. The responsibility for this selfregulation must ultimately be exercised by the courts through judicial review.
However, constitutional law is not static; it is constantly changing through a process of evaluation, adjustment, and even reversal.' The decisions of the Supreme
Court vacillate between both ends of the political spectrum in an attempt to achieve
a balance, a sense of parity, between the rights of the accused and the welfare
of the public.
It is within this context that we must examine New York v. Quarles,5 a landmark case decided by the Supreme Court on June 12, 1984, dealing with the fifth

4

Foley, Individual Liberty and the Rule of Law, 7 WLAMIETTE L.J. 396 (1971).
THE FEDERA. uS, No. 51 (J. Madison).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
R. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, xxxi (Sth ed. 1979).
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
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amendment protection against self-incrimination. The fifth amendment provides
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
The Quarles decision recognized a "public safety" exception to the enforcement
of this constitutional right, holding that when an interrogation is conducted under
circumstances which represent a danger to the public resulting from the exigency
of the situation, the officer does not have to read the suspect his rights as previously determined by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona:
(1) the right to remain silent;
(2) the fact that any statements may be used against him in court;
(3) the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and
(4)the fact that an attorney will be appointed free of charge if he cannot afford

one.

6

The Court's holding in Quarles clearly shifts the balance in favor of a concern
for the public welfare. As one analyzes the Quarles decision and its significance
with regard to the protection of individual rights, it should be kept in mind that
"the Court has a proper role to play in a democratic society, and that this role
and the values it brings to a democracy depend both on how it does its job and
the decisions which it produces." 7
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Benjamin Quarles was initially detained and later formally arrested on the basis
of statements made by a woman who identified him as the man who had just raped
her. The victim described her assailant to police officers, indicated that he was
carrying a gun, and stated that he had just entered a nearby supermarket. An officer entered the store and identified Quarles based upon the woman's description.
The officer chased the suspect to the rear of the store with his gun drawn, then
lost sight of him momentarily. When he saw the suspect again, the officer ordered
him to stop and directed him to place his hands over his head; the officer then
frisked him and found that his shoulder holster was empty. He handcuffed the
suspect and, before reading the standard Miranda warnings, asked him where the
gun was located. Quarles nodded to some empty cartons and answered: "the gun
is over there." The officer retrieved the gun, formally arrested the suspect, and
then read him his complete Miranda rights. Quarles informed the officers that he
would answer questions without an attorney present and stated that he did own
the gun.
A New York trial court ruled that the defendant's initial statement regarding
the location of the gun be excluded because he had not previously been given the
6 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73.

R. CusHmAN, supra note 4, at xxxi.
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Miranda warnings. His other statements as well as the handgun were excludable
as evidence tainted by the Miranda violation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
The issues before the Supreme Court on certiorari were essentially: (1) whether
the defendant's initial statements regarding the location of the gun should be
excluded due to the officer's failure to read him the Miranda rights prior to questioning; and (2) whether the defendant's subsequent statements and the physical
evidence should be excluded as illegal fruits of the Miranda violation. The Court
reversed the New York Court of Appeals on both of these issues. A five-member
majority held that despite the fact Quarles was in police custody when he made
his incriminating statements and that the case seemingly fell within the parameters
of the Miranda decision, the arresting officer was nevertheless justified in omitting
to read the defendant his rights because of the overriding importance of protecting
the safety of the public. The Court thus fashioned a "narrow exception" to Miranda
which operates to excuse the mandatory reading of rights in "situations presenting
a danger to the public safety."'
III. PIoR LAW
A.

The Pre-Miranda "Voluntariness Test"

The first case in which the Supreme Court dealt with the admissibility of confessions was Bram v. United States,9 a federal case decided in 1897. In Brain, a
criminal defendant was stripped and subjected to extensive interrogation before
making incriminating statements. In reversing his conviction, the Court spoke in
terms which foreshadowed its reasoning almost seventy years later in its landmark
Miranda decision, stating that "under the law of nature . . . one accused could
not be compelled to testify against himself."'" This philosophy-that the privilege
against self-incrimination was fundamental and inalienable-was reaffirmed in the
long line of cases which followed."
The Court summarized its attitude toward confession cases in Blackburn v.
Alabama, 2 where Chief Justice Warren stated:
As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes be convicted, there
are considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence. Thus, in

W

Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
Id. at 547-48.

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Liseba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons
v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954); see generally Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Observations, and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. REv. 39, 43 n.17 (1966).
22 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
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cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency
of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out
of an accused against his will.'"
Prior to the Court's adoption of the Mirandadoctrine in 1966, the Court relied
on "the more pliable dictates of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"'" to determine whether an individual in police custody was
coerced into giving an involuntary confession or was not given adequate warnings
as to his rights. The standard to be applied was one of "voluntariness" which,
as stated in Haynes v. Washington,1 depended upon an assessment of "[the] totality
of circumstances evidencing an involuntary . . . admission of guilt.'" 6 Under this
test, the burden was placed on the state to prove that the accused knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel." Justice O'Conner, writing a concurring
and dissenting opinion in Quarles,summarized the "totality of circumstances" test:
"If the interrogation was deemed unreasonable or shocking or if the accused clearly
did not have an opportunity to make a rational or intelligent choice, the statements
received would be inadmissible."'' I
The evolution of the Court's position on the protection guaranteed by the fifth
amendment was closely linked to cases involving the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure and the sixth amendment guarantee
of right to counsel, as all three are intended to secure the rights of the individual
and, in many cases, become factually and procedurally intertwined. Thus, the sixth
amendment cases beginning with Powell v. Alabama 9 developed collaterally with
those cases which involved coerced confessions. Escobedo v. Illinois,20 which was
"couched in sixth amendment language yet... dealt with a traditional fifth amendment problem,"'" brought both strains of cases together. In Escobedo, the accused
asked to have a lawyer present during his interrogation; this request was denied,
and the police obtained several incriminating statements from him. Justice Goldberg,
writing for a majority of five, moved beyond the strictures of the earlier "voluntariness" rule:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken

into policy custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself

"1 Id. at 206-07.
,4Miranda, 384 U.S. at 503.

'1Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
16 Id. at 514.
17 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 503.
11Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2635.
" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 486 (1982).
20 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
21

Warden, supra note 11, at 44.
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to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, . . . no statement elicited2
by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.

B.

Miranda and Its Progeny

It was against this background of obvious concern, but rather nebulous solutions, that the Court handed down its famous Mirandadecision. The Court's earlier
ruling in Escobedo had created several difficult questions: whether the accused must
specifically request the presence of an attorney; whether he had to be advised of
his right to counsel; and whether
he must be told that any statement that he made
23
could be used against him.
The Warren Court selected Miranda in an effort to clear up the uncertainty
which shrouded the confession issue, because it represented a typical example of

the conduct of an ordinary policy precinct interrogation. Miranda was arrested on
charges of rape and kidnapping. He was taken to the police station for questioning
and made a voluntary confession which, he acknowledged, was made in the absence
of threats or promises. Importantly, however, Miranda was not informed of his
2
right to the presence of an attorney during interrogation. 1
The Court's holding and message in Miranda is emphatic and quite clear: "[The
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
'2 5
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court further maintained that:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling

pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.2,

The "proper safeguards" referred to are, of course, the mandatory reading
of what were to become known as the Miranda rights. Thus, Miranda went much
further than the "voluntariness" rule of Haynes and the "particular suspect" criteria
of Escobedo, substantially changing all prior law dealing with confessions by
establishing a "presumption" that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.
Moreover, "[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental
'27
with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual.
32

Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.

Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 574 (1970).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492.
21 Id. at 444.
:3

2,

26 Id. at 467.

17Id. at 476.
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This intimate relationship between the Miranda warnings and the constitutional
guarantee has been succinctly stated by one writer: "In short, when Miranda is
violated, the fifth amendment is violated.""8
In sum, the effect of the Miranda holding was that it provided "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow" 2 9-a "bright
line" test which could not be ignored. The Court's decision in Miranda was extremely controversial and prompted strong criticism from members of the Court,
legal scholars, and law enforcement officials. Justice Clark dissented from the
majority, arguing for the more flexible "totality of the circumstances" test." Justices
Harlan, Stewart, and White also dissented, urging that the decision was the product of poor constitutional law and failed to adequately protect society's interest
in efficient law enforcement. 3 1 Each of these criticisms would be put forth again
and again in the post-Miranda years, gradually chipping away at the concrete
Miranda guidelines.
The character of the Court was dramatically altered as a result of the four
appointments made during the Nixon administration: Chief Justice Warren Burger
and Justice Harry Blackmun were appointed to the Court in 1969, replacing Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justice Abe Fortas; Justice Lewis Powell joined the Court
in 1971, replacing Justice Hugo Black; and Justice William Rehnquist joined the
Court in 1972, replacing Justice John Marshall Harlan. These four changes in the
Court's composition replaced two of the original five-to-four Miranda majority.2
The Warren Court and the Burger Court represent opposite ends of the
precarious balance between the rights of the individual and the interest in the welfare
of society, the Warren Court emphasizing "fairness" and the rights of the individual,
and the Burger Court demonstrating its concern for "law and order and the necessity
of punishing the factually guilty."13 3 These antithetical approaches are readily
apparent when one examines the Burger Court's treatment of the self-incrimination
issue. In the years following the Miranda decision, beginning in 1971 after Warren
Burger had assumed the role of Chief Justice, the Court handed down eleven decisions
concerning the scope and application of Miranda, and not a single item of evidence
4
was held inadmissible under the authority of Miranda.1
Moreover, some scholars
maintain the Burger Court has clearly eroded the primary logic and theory which
were the cornerstones of the Miranda doctrine "by narrowing the scope of the
original holding, by refusing to apply Miranda to situations clearly within the explicit
purview of the Miranda rule, and by refusing to extend the Miranda protections
Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.

2,

405, 416 (1982).
2, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 502.
I'
Id. at 508-09.

"
312

13
1'

Sonenshein, supra note 28, at 406.
Id. at 405-07.
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 100-01.
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35
to suspects finding themselves in situations implicitly addressed by Miranda."

Harrisv. New York 3 was the first such opinion of the Burger Court. In Harris, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether defendant's statements to police,
though excludable due to police failure to give the mandatory Miranda warnings,
would be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility
as a witness. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that Miranda
was only a bar with respect to the government's case-in-chief, and that it would
not prevent the use of evidence for other purposes such as impeachment.3
The Burger Court's tendency to limit the application of the Miranda doctrine
was clearly demonstrated in Michigan v. Tucker.3 The defendant in Tucker, while
being interrogated on a charge of rape and assault, was read all of his Miranda
rights with the exception of the right to appointed counsel. The Court took the
opportunity to create a clear and emphatic distinction between Miranda'sprophylactic rule and the fifth amendment. Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, held
that the statements made by the defendant were admissible because the rights set
forth in Miranda are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution." Rather,
they are merely warnings which protect the constitutional right against compulsory
self-incrimination. 39 This conclusion is directly in conflict with the precepts on which
the Warren Court's Miranda decision was founded. In essence, Tucker stopped
just one step short of overruling Miranda, thus resulting in further erosion of the
once concrete Miranda standard.
Several other cases decided by the Burger Court have arguably expanded the
reach of the Miranda doctrine. However, this expansion has focused on those circumstances which constitute custodial interrogation, and not on the question of
the admissibility of evidence in the wake of a Miranda violation." Thus, taken
together, Harris and Tucker demonstrate the Burger Court's treatment of cases
involving the consequences of Miranda violations. Some scholars have criticized
this approach as "misrepresentation of precedent to give the appearance of consistency with earlier cases, arbitrarily limiting broad, prophylactic decisions to their
particular facts, and a tendency toward eradication of Miranda's bright line
standard."'"

It is against this background of case law-the rule established by the Warren
Court, the Burger Court's historical treatment of the Miranda progeny, and the
charges of the Court's critics and dissenters-that one must examine the reasoning

Sonenshein, supra note 28, at 405-07.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
" Id. at 224.
iS Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
9 Id. at 444.
40 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (police car); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S.
324 (1969) (defendant's bedroom); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (prison cell).
41 Sonenshein, supra note 28, at 422.
"

"
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and impact of the Court's decision in New York v. Quarles. Specifically, this Author
shall consider whether Quarlesis merely the next step in the dimming of Miranda's
"bright line," or the elucidation of an intrinsic exception.
IV.
A.

TIE REHNQUIST MAJORITY

Some PreliminaryRemarks

It is important at the outset to highlight some of the differences, both factual
and philosophical, which serve to distinguish Quarles from its predecessor. Importantly, the linchpin in Miranda's analysis was the theory that custodial interrogation is inherently compelling and must be controlled through the proper safeguards.
The Quarles decision, on the other hand, was not concerned solely with whether
an admission of guilt or an incriminating statement was compelled. Rather, the
issue which Quarles addressed was whether a "compelling" custodial interrogation
may be justified on the basis of a legitimate need to protect the public safety.
Miranda dealt explicitly with the protection of fifth amendment rights and provided a suitable vehicle for establishing a per se rule. It did not address the necessity
of exceptions or limitations on the right it recognized. Quarles discussed the issue
more fully in a factual situation vastly different from that in Miranda. In addition,
Mirandainvolved the traditional precinct custodial interrogation, whereas Quarles
was based upon on-the-scene questioning immediately following the apprehension
of the defendant. The key questions to consider in analyzing the Quarles decision
are (1) whether the different factual situations necessitate or legitimize separate
standards, and (2) based upon the facts present in Quarles, was there actually a
danger to public safety.
B.

The Cost-Benefit Analysis

Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion for the Court, began his discussion with
the declaration that "concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence
to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.""' Moreover,
he emphasized the fact that there was "no claim that [defendant's] statements were
actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist."' 3 In determining that a threat to public safety existed under the facts of the case, Rehnquist
stated: "So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with
its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the
public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might
later come upon it." ' 4" Having established that the mandatory Miranda warnings
are separate from the fifth amendment, Justice Rehnquist resorted to a "cost-benefit
analysis" in defense of his public safety exception. He reasoned that the Miranda
majority was correct in its assumption that society can bear the cost of fewer con42

Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2630.

Id. at 2631.
44 Id. at 2632.
41
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victions; however, the fact situation was noticeably different in the Quarles case:
"Here, had Mirandawarnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's
question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something
more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting Quarles.""
Rehnquist maintained that the cost in this case was the danger of an undisclosed
gun in the grocery store and, while society can bear the cost of fewer convictions,
it should not be required to do so in the face of a demonstrable danger to the
public."
Justice Rehnquist was apparently content to sacrifice the clarity of the Miranda
doctrine due to "the importance of [fashioning] a workable rule '4 7 to guide police
officers. It was this utility, combined with the overriding concern of public safety,
that lead Justice Rehnquist to the conclusion that: "We hold that on these facts
there is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be
given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the
availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual
officers involved." '48 On the basis of this "public safety" exception, the statement
"the gun is over there" should not have been excluded and, likewise, all subsequent statements and the handgun were not excludable as illegal fruits since "there
.
[was] no violation of Miranda in [the] case. ...

C. Historical Bases
1. Federal Precedents
The public safety exception which Justice Rehnquist propounded is not an innovative concept. Its roots are deeply entrenched in the foundation of an "exigent
circumstance" exception adopted and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in other
contexts, and is also closely related to the "rescue doctrine" developed by the progressive Supreme Court of California. In his defense of the "public safety" exception, Justice Rehnquist relied primarily on four federal precedents: Michigan v.
Tyler,5" Warden v. Hayden,"' Johnson v. United States,"2 and Mincey v. Arizona.53
The Tyler case stated the "exigent circumstance" doctrine in its most general sense
with regard to fourth amendment search and seizure: "A burning building clearly
presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry
reasonable. ' 54 Warden v. Hayden, which involved a warrantless search of a house
45 Id.
46

Id. at 2633.

47

Id.

41 Id. at 2632.
41 Id. at 2634 n.9.

10Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
",Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
82 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
11 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).

1,Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509.
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in which an armed robbery suspect was believed to be present, gives further clarity
to the doctrine:
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of

an investigation if to do so would endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed
here was essential and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons
could have insured that [defendant] was the only man present and that the police

had control of all weapons which could be used against them."
This is a situation very similar to the facts surrounding the Quarles case: Was an
immediate questioning of Quarles, prior to reading him his Miranda rights, and
search of the premises the only way in which the police could have insured their
safety and the safety of those in the store?
Johnson v. United States points to some additional qualifications of the "exigent
circumstances" doctrine. Johnson involved a police search for opium without a
warrant. The Court refused to justify the warrantless search on the basis of exigent
circumstances, finding that: "No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight. The
search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction. ' ""1The record from the New
York Court of Appeals indicates that Quarles, like the defendant in Johnson, was
adequately restrained and that the gun was definitely on the premises with no threat
of removal.
Mincey v. Arizona involved a narcotics raid on the defendant's apartment during which an undercover policeman was shot. An extensive warrantless search of
the premises resulted in the seizure of between 200 and 300 items, and the defendant was convicted of narcotics violations. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Stewart, reaffirmed that "the need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency."" However, this rule must be read in light of the Court's holding in
Terry v. Ohio5 that "a warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation." 5 9 Justice Stewart maintained that on the
basis of the facts presented, which included a police fatality, the search was not
justified by "any emergency threatening life or limb" because all persons had been
accounted for before the search began." The facts of Quarles clearly do not indicate any fatalities or direct threat to life or limb and, since the defendant had
no accomplice, the whereabouts of all participants was known.

11Hayden, 387 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added).
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15.

s,Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (1963)).
' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"

Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)).
o Id. at 393.
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2. State Precedents
There is a line of relevant California cases to consider in the analysis of Justice
Rehnquist's determination that a public safety exception was justified on the facts
of the Quarles arrest. People v. Dean 1 concerned the interrogation of the accused
in order to determine the location of a kidnap victim. Although this case obviously
was not binding upon the Supreme Court, its discussion of the exigency issue involved is extremely helpful:
The Fourth Amendment emergency doctrine has been applied for the purpose of
protection of life. Where the preservation of life is at stake and consists of the
sole motivating force behind the conduct of the officers, which conduct is reasonable
under the circumstances, there is no rational basis to distinguish the protections

of the Fifth Amendment from the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In either
case, the issue is that of saving a life. For all practical purposes, the rescue doctrine

under the Fifth Amendment and the emergency doctrine under the Fourth Amend62
ment are one and the same to the extent that they operate to protect life.
Based on the discussion in Dean and the fourth amendment cases, it appears
that Justice Rehnquist was correct in concluding that there is a "public safety"
exception, "exigent circumstance" doctrine, or "rescue doctrine" implicit in
Miranda, and that this doctrine may be applicable in many situations. However,
the carefully developed exceptions in the case law also lead this Author to agree
with Justice Marshall that, given the facts of the Quarles case, the public was not
exposed to danger commensurate with that required to trigger the doctrine. There
was no threat that the evidence would be removed: all persons had been accounted
for, and there was no reason to believe that there was any emergency threatening
life or limb. The sole justification, then, for the violation of Quarles' fifth amendment right was that "a customer or employee" might come upon the gun. An undisclosed gun in a situation completely controlled by the police when the arresting
officer "knew with a high degree of certainty that the defendant's gun was within
the immediate vicinity of the encounter" does not seem to constitute a significant
threat to public safety. 63
Assuming that there is a valid public safety exception to Miranda, when is
it applicable? Specifically, how serious must the threat to safety be in order to
invoke the doctrine? The California Supreme Court, in its examination of the "rescue
doctrine" prior to the Miranda decision, maintained that a critical factor to be
considered was whether there was a life at stake. People v. Modesto6" concerned
police efforts to discover the location of a twelve-year-old girl who was missing.
The police had found her nine-year-old sister murdered and had arrested a suspect.
61 People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d
62 Id. at 885, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 562

875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
(emphasis added).
63 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2643. For further discussion, see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
64 People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
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Before informing the defendant of his rights, the officers questioned him regarding
the whereabouts of the girl. Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, stated:
"The paramount interest in saving [the girl's] life, if possible, clearly justified the
officers in not impeding their rescue efforts by informing defendant of his rights
to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel." 6 People v. Dean,6" decided eight
years after the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda, reaffirmed the vitality of the
rescue doctrine in light of the mandatory Miranda warnings. In avoiding the strictures of the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda, the California court observed that
"[t]he majority opinion gives no guide to what officers should do when confronted
with a balancing between the life of a victim and the protection of a suspect's
constitutional rights." ' 67 Miranda did not consider exigent circumstances involving
an immediate threat to public safety.
We are convinced that the Modesto rule was not formulated in a vacuum which
did not recognize Miranda considerations.
...It would seem to this court that even more basic than the right of a citizen
not to be compelled to incriminate himself is the right of a citizen to his life. 8

People v. Riddle" also gave an extended analysis to the rescue doctrine in light
of the requirements imposed by Miranda. Riddle, like the other California cases
above, concerned police efforts to locate a missing woman following the arrest
of a suspect who was believed to have been responsible for her disappearance. In
its discussion of the principle of exigent circumstances the court stated that "application of the principle

. . .

is not restricted to situations where human life is

at stake." 7 In support of this statement the court cited the following examples:
Warden v. Hayden" (warrantless entry of a house by police in hot pursuit of flee72
ing suspect); Ker v. California
(warrantless and unannounced entry to prevent
imminent destruction of evidence); Michigan v. Tyler73 (warrantless search to
extinguish a fire and investigate for arson); Wayne v. United States7 (forcible warrantless entry into an apartment to save human life); People v. Hill7 1 (warrantless
entry into residence where the victim had been murdered two hours earlier); and
People v. Sirhan76 (warrantless entry to seize evidence where a reasonable belief

Id.at 423, 398 P.2d at 759.
Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555.
Id. at 879, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
I7
Id. at 882, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 567, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 937 (1979).
70 Id. at 574, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294.
"

72 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (1963).

People v. Hill, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1 (1974), overruled, People v. DeVaughn, 18
Cal. 3d 889, 135 Cal. Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872 (1977).
, " People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121 (1972), cert. denied, 410
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existed of a conspiracy to assassinate political candidates). Even in light of California's expansive view of the exigent circumstances doctrine, however, none of the
factors specifically mentioned was present in Quarles.
The court in Riddle also reexamined Miranda "to determine whether its rules
of procedure [were] intended to be absolute rules admitting of no exception." 77
First, the court noted that "the factual situation presented in Miranda and dis-'
cussed by the court was that of ongoing criminal investigation ..
*"78 "In this
respect the court's rules for custodial interrogation do not take into account the
possibility of emergency circumstances or consider the possibility of interrogation
for purposes not primarily geared to criminal prosecution. 7 9 Because Mirandahad
not addressed these factors, the court was justified in recognizing an exception.
Second, the goal of Mirandawas to eliminate the misconduct of police associated
with "third-degree" questioning,80 an objective which is not relevant to on-thescene or emergency questioning in situations involving an identifiable threat to public
safety. Based upon these inherent limitations on Miranda's scope, the Riddle court
concluded that "exigent circumstances may excuse compliance with the Miranda
rules in instances of overriding need to save human life or to rescue persons whose
lives are in danger."'" Under the Riddle court's analysis, "an emergency sufficient
to excuse the Miranda requirements" may arise if the following elements are met:
(1) Urgency of need in that no other course of action promises relief;
(2) The possibility of saving human life by rescuing a person whose life is in
danger; and
(3) Rescue as the primary purpose and motive of interrogators. 2
A review of these factors suggests that Quarles did not fall within the exigent
circumstances rule articulated by the California court. First, as previously discussed,
the police officers in Quarles did have an alternate course of action; rather than
violating Quarles' fifth amendment rights by asking "where is the gun," the officers merely had to seal off an area over which they already had control and to
begin a search for the missing weapon. The urgency of need does not, in light
of this alternative, appear to be sufficient. Second, there were no persons who needed
to be rescued or who were in imminent danger. There was merely a remote possibility
of harm to an undetermined group of people. Third, even if rescue was the primary
purpose of the officers' questioning, based upon the facts from the record, their
motivation was arguably misplaced.
U.S. 947 (1973), overruled, Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d
916 (1978).
71Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
7 Id.
79 Id.

Id.
Id. at 574, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
Id. at 576, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
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In the final analysis, the issue becomes one of priorities. When the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Miranda,it rejected the argument that society's
need for interrogation outweighs the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination, citing to Chambers v. Florida, which stated in relevant part: "No
higher duty, no more solemn responsibility, rests upon this Court than that of
translating into living law and maintaining the constitutional shield deliberately
planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our
Constitution. '8 3 When reading these words in light of the Court's later statement
in Mincey v. Arizona, "' that "[tihe need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency,"8' 5 one cannot help but think that Miranda was not intended to apply
to situations where a life is imperiled. People v. Willis8' summarized this point:
"The interest in saving a human life is considered to be outside the parameters
of the constitutional protection afforded against self incrimination." '
VI.

Tiis SEPARATE OPINION s OF O'CONNER AND MARSHALL

Though the Quarles majority utilized a type of cost-benefit analysis in discussing the application of Miranda, Justice O'Conner, concurring and dissenting in
part, employed a strict constitutional method reflective of Chief Justice Warren's
opinion in Miranda. She quoted approvingly from Miranda, stating that in the
absence of Miranda warnings all statements are presumed to be coerced and must
be excluded.8 9 She dissented from the majority on the grounds that:
The justification the Court provides for upsetting the equilibrium that has finally
been achieved-that police cannot and should not balance considerations of a public
safety against the individual's interest in avoiding compulsory testimonial selfincrimination-really misses the critical question to be decided ...

[which is] who

shall bear the cost of securing the public safety when such questions are asked
and answered. . . . Miranda placed that burden on the state.' 0
An exigent situation does not diminish the compelling nature of custodial interrogation so as to justify.shifting the burden from the state to the individual. 9' On
these bases, Justice O'Conner concluded that the statements made by the accused
should be held inadmissible; however, she reasoned that "nontestimonial evidence
such as the gun should not be suppressed.
... 91
11 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
84 Id. at 241.
" Mincey, 437 U.S. 385.
86 Id. at 392.
People v. Willis, 104 Cal. App. 3d 433, 163 Cal. Rptr. 718, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 (1980).
Id. at 448, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2635 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-79).
90 Id. at 2636.

91 Id.
92

Id. at 2641. See infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
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The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens, is the most critical of the majority's reasoning. Marshall charged that the
majority misread Miranda completely, and ignored its emphatic statements that
the rights of the fifth amendment cannot be abridged and that custodial interrogations are inherently coercive.9" The dissent also challenged the necessity of a public
safety exception. "While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits on funconsented
questioning], nothing in the Fifth Amendment or our decision in Miranda v. Arizona
proscribes this sort of emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids
is the introduction of coerced statements at trial." 94
A similar position was taken by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Castellano."
Castellano concerned a situation where the accused was arrested on the charge of
possession of a firearm; police questioned Castellano as to the location of the weapon
prior to reading him his Miranda rights. The court affirmed that:
Even if the questions had a legitimate security purpose... Mirandawarnings should
have preceded them. First, . . . [i]f a detainee is truly dangerous, it is unlikely

that he will reveal the locatiofil of weapons essential to his own security. Second,
it would be difficult to define what is a "security" or "safety" inquiry .... Third,
under existing authority the police may take direct action and search a suspicious,
Such a search would seem to provide much better protecdangerous detainee ....
tion than mere questioning. In sum, we feel that a "security" exception to Miranda
measurably without providing substantially greater prowould erode that doctrine
96
tection for the public.
Marshall urged that a public safety exception is not only unnecessary in a constitutional sense. Even if one assumes the legitimacy of such a limitation on Miranda,
the dissent argued that it would be inapplicable to the facts of the Quarles case.
The factual assumption that the public was in danger, Marshall observed, was incorrect and in conflict with the findings of the New York Court of Appeals:
Quarles had been "reduced to a condition of physical powerlessness." .. . Quarles
was not believed to have, nor did he in fact have, an accomplice to come to his
rescue. When the questioning began the arresting officers were sufficiently confident of their safety to put away their' 97guns. As Officer Kraft acknowledged
. . . "the situation was under control.
These statements were in direct conflict with the majority's findings of fact, leaving
as the sole justification for invoking the exception the mere possibility that "a
customer or employee might later come upon [the gun] '998
Finally, the dissent challenged that "in the beguiling language of utilitarianism,
11Id. at 2645-46.
91 Id. at 2648.

91United States v. Castellano, 448 F.2d 65 (1974).
Id. at 67 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
I9
91 Id. at 2642 (citations omitted).
9" Id. at 2632.
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the Court has sanctioned sub silentio criminal prosecution based on compelled selfincriminating statements .

.

. in direct conflict with the Fifth Amendment ...

-IMThe majority countered this criticism, arguing that it "merely reject[ed] the
. . . argument

. . .

that the statement must be presumed compelled because of

Officer Kraft's failure to read him his Miranda warnings."' 0 0 It justified this contention on the grounds that "the Miranda Court itself recognized ...

the failure

to provide Miranda warnings in and of itself does not render a confession
involuntary."' 0 ' The dissent found this argument unpersuasive, and took the majority
to task for ad hoc constitutional decision-making which threatened the effectiveness
of the Bill of Rights as a safeguard of individual liberty.' °2 Accordingly, Justice
Marshall found that Quarles' testimony should be inadmissible under the fifth
amendment and would remand the matter of the admissibility of the gun for further consideration.
VII.

MIRANDA AND NONTESTIMONIAL

EVIDENCE

Although the majority does not dwell upon the issue of the admissibility of
the gun, Justice O'Conner and Justice Marshall adopt substantially different views
on the matter. Justice O'Conner maintained that Wong Sun v. United States"°3
would not, under its "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis, bar the admission of
the gun because of the prior Mirandaviolation. Rather, she contended that Wong
Sun, properly read in light of Michigan v. Tucker,'0 4 "leads to exclusion of derivative
evidence only where the underlying police misconduct infringes a 'core' constitutional right."'0 3 Because Miranda was merely a tool to implement a defendant's
fifth amendment rights, and was not itself a right protected by the Constitution,
the rule of Wong Sun would not apply to exclude the handgun. ,
It is significant that in her fervent defense of the mandatory reading of Miranda
warnings, Justice O'Conner has strayed from the original underpinnings of the
Miranda decision. Recall Miranda's declaration that "the requirement of warning,
and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the fifth amendment
privilege,"' 1 thereby making the Miranda warnings and the fifth amendment
guaranfee virtually synonymous. The focal point of Justice O'Conner's argument
in support of Miranda is her acceptance of its presumption that custodial interrogations are inherently compelling.'0 0 Thus, she favors the compulsory reading
"

Id. at 2648.
Id. at 2631 n.5.
Id. n.5 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457) (but see the Miranda Court's discussion of the

need for a prophylatic rule to better protect the defendant in a custodial setting).
Id. at 2649.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
101Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2640 n.4 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46).
£92

"06
'o7

Id.
Miranda, 384 U.S. 476. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2635.
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of Mirandawarnings before questioning. However, in light of her analysis regarding the admissibility of the gun, she denies that these warnings rise to the level
of "core" or "fundamental" constitutional rights, and therefore appears to be
in accord with the major premise of Rehnquist's majority opinion.' °9
Importantly, the gun is probably as damaging to Quarles as is his statement,
"the gun is over there." Thus, Justice O'Conner is in a curious position-arguing
adamantly that Miranda rights must be given complete protection, and then
nullifying the benefits of such protection by refusing to exclude tainted evidence.
In support of her position, she relied on Nix v. Williams '" which held that "evidence
which inevitably would have been discovered need not be excluded at trial because
of independent police misconduct.""' Justice Marshall termed this approach "a
radical departure from precedent,"" 2 arguing that the inevitable discovery theory
had not been raised before the New York court and should be ruled upon by that
court on remand. ' 3 To insure that fifth amendment rights are not secured and
then capriciously denied, Justice Marshall's position appears to be the wisest alternative. The court should rule on this matter only after full consideration by the

lower courts.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether one accepts the theory that a "public safety" exception
is unnecessary, already provided for in existing law, or an intrinsic corollary to
the Miranda decision if read broadly, the result is the same-such an exception
should not be in conflict with Miranda and the protection of fifth amendment rights.
Of course, a strict reading of Miranda will lead to a different conclusion; however,
the law should not be so rigid as to preclude flexibility in response to the evolution
of new perspectives and situations. The law must not only be viewed as a just and
equitable standard governing man's behavior. It must be a workable standard as
well, malleable within reason in response to the exigencies of the situation, in order
that the highest approximation of justice for all might be attained. In this respect,
the scales of justice must weigh the conflicting priorities which they seek to secure.
In New York v. Quarles, the Court was faced with the difficult task of balancing the constitutional rights of the individual-vested and jealously guarded-and
the welfare of the public. Justice Marshall argued persuasively that under the circumstances of this case, the fifth amendment rights of the accused were violated
without justification. The facts did not demonstrate a danger to the public which

"I Compare O'Conner's characterization of Miranda warnings as a "nonconstitutional prophylactic,"
id. at 2640 n.4, with Rehnquist's assertion that such warnings "are not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution. . .
"'

'

."

Id. at 2631 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).

Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
Quarles, 104 S.Ct. at 2640 n.4.
Id. at 2649 n.ll.

1' Id.
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was sufficient to outweigh the interest of the Court in protecting the constitutional
rights of the individual involved. However, the fact the exception was not applicable
in this case does not undermine its validity and applicability in circumstances which
warrant its use. The precedential cases relied on by the majority demonstrate that
an "exigent circumstances" or "public safety" exception was not an anomaly created
by the Quarles majority in an effort to further dim the "bright line" of Miranda.
It is in fact an exception which, although not widely used, was nevertheless firmly
established by other decisions.
The recent line of California cases cited above served to refine and clarify
the parameters of the public safety exception in terms of an analogous "rescue
doctrine." By conceding the legitimacy of such an exception, these cases reach the
question of when its use may properly be justified. The preservation of life is the
primary justification offered by the California courts. In this respect the analysis
is succinct: The right to life is fundamentally superior to the right against selfincrimination. However, based upon a fair reading of these cases, it is apparent
that the threat to another's life must be direct and immediate, not remote or undetermined as in the Quarles case. Justification of a public safety exception has also
been grounded upon the need to prevent destruction of property and removal of
evidence; neither of these factors was even remotely possible in Quarles.
The reasoning of the majority is sound in terms of its analysis of the existence
and validity of the exception, but it falters with regard to its applicability. The
reasoning of Justice O'Conner's separate opinion is questionable at best. She defends
Miranda in theory, only to nullify it in practice with an evidentiary distinction between the admissibility of testimonial and nontestimonial derivative evidence. She
welcomes the accused to the fruitful table of constitutional protection, only to pull
the chair out from under him. Justice Marshall's dissent is significant both in terms
of his critique of the majority's factual application of the public safety exception
and his analysis of its necessity. He argues in substance that the fifth amendment
does not prohibit emergency questioning, but only the admissibility of coerced
statements at trial. His reasoning on these issues is sound and persuasive. However,
he appears excessively dogmatic to this Author in his adherence to the clear guidelines
of Miranda, since the public safety exception, though theoretically unnecessary,
is nevertheless valid, useful, and workable.
While this case is unquestionably significant in terms of its determination of
another exception to Miranda, its impact on future litigation should not prove
to be overwhelmingly disruptive. It is unlikely that an onslaught of cases in which
the police can defend illegitimate violations of Mirandabased upon Quarles' public
safety exception will be successful, provided that in case-by-case analyses the courts
consistently apply-proper scrutiny to determine if the facts disclose a genuine threat
to the public safety.
When one considers the role of the judiciary and the myriad values which it
seeks to uphold in its decisions, the philosophy and impact of the Quarles decision
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should not be judged too harshly. Its significance should not be evaluated solely
with respect to encroachment upon individual liberty, but rather in terms of its
attempt to pursue and inculcate a higher goal-the welfare of the citizenry. The
Quarles majority has merely adopted a philosophically-based inquiry from the natural
law. The question has become: Is there an interest involved which is deemed to
be ethically or morally imperative, such that it would outweigh the interest in the
safeguard of individual liberty. This is admittedly not the definitive rule of Miranda,
but one which reworks the balance of public and private interests by permitting
the narrowing of a criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination to better
secure the welfare of the public-at-arge.
W. Scott Campbell
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